Cast Out: New Voter Suppression Strategies
Securing the Vote in Context
Background: How We Got Here
What We Can Do to Ensure That Everyone Who Is Legally Entitled to Vote Can, and That Their Intended Votes Will Be Recorded and Accurately Counted
Brennan Center Efforts to Fight Threats to the Franchise
Machinery of Democracy: Voting System Security Report
Summary of Findings and Recommendations
The Need for a Methodical Threat Analysis
Solid Threat Analyses Should Help Make Voting Systems More Reliable
Identification of Threats
Prioritizing Threats: Number of Informed Participants as Metric
Effects of Implementing Countermeasure Sets
Representative Model for Evaluation of Attacks and Countermeasures: Governor's Race, State of Pennasota, 2007
Evaluating Attacks in Pennasota
Targeting the Fewest Counties
Testing the Strength of Our Findings
Nine Categories of Attacks
Lessons from the Catalogs: Retail Attacks Should Not Change the Outcome of Most Close Statewide Elections
Software Attacks on Voting Machines
History of Software-Based Attacks
Vendor Desire to Prevent Software Attack Programs
Inserting the Attack Program
Points of Attack: COTS and Vendor Software
Creating an Attack Program That Changes Votes
Eluding Independent Testing Authority Inspections
Avoiding Detection During Testing
Avoiding Detection After the Polls Have Closed
Least Difficult Attacks Applied Against Each System
Attacks Against DREs Without VVPT
Attacks Against DREs w/VVPT
Prevention of Wireless Communication: A Powerful Countermeasure for All Three Systems
Directions for the Future
Witness and Cryptographic Systems
Informing Voters of Their Role in Making Systems More Secure
Additional Statistical Technical Techniques to Detect Fraud
Looking for Better Parallel Testing Techniques
Looking at Other Attack Goals
Appendix A. Alternative Threat Analysis Models Considered
Appendix B. Alternative Security Metrics Considered
Appendix C. Voting Machine Testing
Appendix D. Example of Transparent Random Selection Processes
Appendix F. Tables Supporting Pennasota Assumptions
Appendix G. Denial-of-Service Attacks
Appendix H. Chances of Catching Attack Program Through Parallel Testing
Appendix I. Chances of Catching Attack Program Through the ARA
Appendix J. Subverting the Audit
Appendix K. Effective Procedures for Dealing With Evidence of Fraud or Error
Voting System Vulnerabilities
